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ABSTRACT 
 
Using  for the first time household survey data from 26 post-
Communist countries,  covering the period 1990-2005, the paper 
examines correlates of  unprecedented increases in inequality registered 
by most of these economies. We find that, after controlling for country-
fixed effects and type of survey used, economic reform (measured by 
the EBRD index) is strongly negatively associated with bottom deciles’ 
income shares and positively with income shares of the top two deciles. 
However, once economic reform is broken into its different component 
parts, the picture is more nuanced: large-scale privatization and 
infrastructure reform (mostly consisting of privatization and higher 
fees) are responsible for this pro-inequality effect while small-scale 
privatization tends to raise income shares of the bottom deciles. 
Acceleration in growth is also pro-rich. On the other hand, 
democratization (measured by the Polity measure) is strongly pro-poor, 
as is lower inflation. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no evidence that 
higher government spending as share of GDI reduces inequality.  
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 1. Inequality in ECA: Literature Review 
 
 Inequality considerations are important to policymakers not only because they are 
linked to the economic state of affairs but also to social and political conditions of a given 
country.  It is even more so in countries of the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union that underwent transition from state-controlled to market economy in the era of 
globalization. However, there is limited number of rigorous empirical studies on the 
evolution of inequality in the transition economies. Although there is lack of consensus 
on the impact of inequality on economic growth, the limited empirical evidence that has 
recently become available for transition countries shows that the effect of inequality on 
growth can be negative and robust (e.g., Ferreira,1999; Ivanova, 2006; Sukiassyan, 2007).  
 
 This section provides a brief review of the literature on the determinants of 
inequality in transition countries, with particular emphasis on the role of institutions and 
government policies pursued under the new economic order following the transition.  The 
paper then attempts to investigate the causes of, and establish some stylized facts on the 
changes in inequality, using a rich data base of household surveys collected over 16 years 
(1990-2005). 
 
 The empirical studies on inequality in transition countries are relatively few in 
numbers despite the importance of the topic. There are only several studies that attempted 
to systematically and empirically investigate inequality in the transition countries and 
provide some possible explanations for its evolution since the beginning of transition 
(Mitra and Yemtsov, 2006; Ferreira, 1999; Milanovic, 1999; Ivaschenko, 2002; 
Giammatteo, 2006).  These studies on the distribution of income immediately, during and 
after the transition show that there has been appreciable increase in inequality in most of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries, albeit at varying degrees in 
magnitude and pace.  A widespread view is that the transition to market economy, which 
entailed several transformations including liberalization capital, goods and services, and 
labor markets and their integration into regional and world markets; privatization of state 
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owned enterprises; and the formation of new institutions to serve the market economy, 
has invariably led to a significant shift in the distribution of income. 
 
 Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) provide a summary of the findings of many studies.  
After careful review of the existing literature, they conclude that all the countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced an increase in inequality, but 
with considerable variations. A rapid increase in inequality took place in the middle-
income and low-income CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)2 countries, whereas 
the new member states of the European Union appear to have experienced a smaller and a 
more gradual increase in inequality.  For example, in Russia, Gini increased from 25.9 in 
1989-90 to 40.9 in 1994, showing a very rapid increase immediately after dismantling of 
the old communist system. In contrast, in Poland, despite a similar level of inequality in 
1989-90 (Gini of 25.5), the level of inequality increased to only 32 by 1995.  
 
 Milanovic (1999) argues that the observed increase in inequality in transition 
countries is driven mainly by higher inequality in wage distribution following the 
dismantling of the state sector with compressed wage structure, and its replacement by 
the newly-emerging private sector with much broader wage distribution. He also finds the 
effects of social transfers to have varied widely, in some cases halting further increases in 
inequality (Poland), and in others (e.g., Russia during the early years of transition) having 
a perverse effects of  contributing to inequality. Ivaschenko’s (2002) looks at the 
determinants of changes in income inequality using a panel of inequality estimates for 24 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries for the period 1989-1998. His is the 
first panel analysis of inequality during transition. Ivaschenko’s main conclusion is that 
increases in inequality are associated with privatization and “deindustrialization” (often 
the two facets of the same phenomenon). He also finds out that there was no significant 
impact of unemployment rate and the size of government spending on income 
distribution. Another interesting finding of the study was the contrast between Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union country groups in the relationship between income 
                                                 
2 It includes all republics of the former Soviet Union expect the three Baltic republics, and since September 
2008, Georgia.  
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inequality and per capita GDP. While there was no association between GDP per capita 
level and changes in inequality in Eastern Europe, Ivaschenko found a significant U-
shaped relationship (the increase in inequality was smallest among middle-income 
countries) between the two variables for the former Soviet Union countries.    
  
 A study by Ivanova (2006) highlighted the effect of government policies on 
inequality using evidence from Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. She shows that 
government policies prompted by the trend towards liberalization and privatization, such 
as reducing social spending, limiting access to social assistance through strong selectivity 
and conditionality criteria, and introducing market-regulated (fee-based) access to many 
social services, have had profoundly negative impact on socioeconomic equality and 
contributed to inequality’s getting embedded in the transforming societies.  According to 
this study, inequality was not only a byproduct of macroeconomic policies, but also a 
natural outcome of the particular model of society chosen by the transition economies, for 
instance, the choice of the minimalist safety-net approach as opposed to the universalistic 
welfare-state approach of the European social market economies.  
 
 While inequality increased in the transition region overall, country specific 
studies provide a clearer trend of changes in inequality within each country.  A study of 
Poland’s income distribution before and during the transition (Keane and Prasad 2002) 
reveals significant increases in inequality as measured by wages from formal 
employment. Keane and Prasad also find that the reallocation of workers from a public 
sector with a compressed wage distribution to a private sector with much higher wage 
inequality, accounts for the bulk of increased earnings inequality during transition.  They 
highlight the role that increased social transfers had in limiting the increase in inequality. 
 
 The unemployment benefits, pensions, family and child allowances that provided 
economic protection for the most vulnerable citizens prior to the transition underwent 
major transformations.  Giammateo (2006) looked at the impact of state transfers (and 
taxes) and market oriented reforms on gross and disposable income inequality.  
Giammateo’s study uses the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) data for Poland, Hungary 
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and Russia, and concludes that these changes led to an increase in inequality in these 
countries between 1990 and 2000. The study showed that Russia had the most unequal 
market and disposable income distribution, followed by Hungary and then Poland. The 
paper concludes that the redistribution policies in some countries played a key role during 
the transition period, allowing the government to contain inequality during the period of 
profound economic and social reforms. The inequality-decreasing effects of state 
transfers were robust and continued to be effective during the latter part of the 1990s, 
particularly in Poland and Hungary.3  
                                                 
3 Insignificant, and possibly perverse, effect of social transfers on inequality in Russia coincides with the 
earlier finding by Milanovic (1999, p. 316). 
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2. Main trends 
 
 In this paper, we use a newly-created data base of inequality statistics for twenty-
six transition economies. It has three important characteristics: (i) it is the largest data 
base because it includes detailed inequality data for more than 200 country/years 
covering the 16 year period (1990-2005), (ii) it is overwhelmingly calculated from micro 
(household-level) survey data, and (iii) we are therefore able to go, in the empirical 
analysis (Sections 3 and 4), beyond the use of the synthetic inequality statistics (such as 
the Gini coefficient) and to use decile shares. The advantage of  the last point is that it 
allows us to have many more observations, and more importantly, presents a much more 
nuanced and accurate picture of the entire distribution than a single number, be  it a Gini, 
Theil or any other synthetic inequality indicator, can. 
 
 Figure 1 summarizes the evolution of inequality in transition countries over the 
period 1990-2005. The top line shows the share of the top decile in total income, the 
bottom line the share of the lowest decile. The biggest distributional changes occurred 
between 1990 and 1995, and since then the distributions have, on average, been  
stable. What happened between 1990 and 1995 was that the share of the top decile 
increased from about 20 percent of total income to about 25 percent (and has been 
remarkably stable since) while the share of the bottom decile dropped from about 4.5 
percent of total income to 3 percent. The top and the bottom deciles registered the biggest 
swings: positive by about a quarter of its previous share for the top decile and negative by 
almost a third for the bottom decile. In contrast, the shares of the middle deciles did not 
change much: the share of the fifth decile dropped from about 8.6 percent to 8.1 percent; 
the share of the sixth from 9.6 to 9.3 etc. This is consistent with other evidence which 
shows that the biggest difference (in cross-country studies) between the relatively 
unequal and relatively equal countries resides in their top and bottom decile shares 
whereas the middle classes’ income shares are relatively stable (Milanovic, 2008; Palma, 
2006). One can thus expect that a temporal change in inequality as here would involve 
most important swings for the two extreme deciles.   
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Figure 1. The evolution of the bottom, middle and top decile’s share of total income 
(in percent of total income)   
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 Note: The unweighted (unbalanced panel) average for 26 economies.  
 
 The total number of inequality observations we have is 209.  At the beginning of 
the period (1990 and 1991), we have observations for only 6 and 7 countries respectively, 
and at the very end of the period (2005) for 9 countries.4 In between, for all other years, 
the number of countries included ranges from 15 to 21. This is because annual data for 
each of the 26 countries are not available whether because the surveys were not 
conducted, or because (less frequently) we did not have access to them. The list of 
countries with their number of observations, and the average top and bottom decile shares 
is given in Annex 1.  We therefore have an unbalanced panel where the number of 
observations ranges from 16 (i.e., available for all years) for Poland to only 2 (for Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Montenegro).  The average number of observations per country is about 
eight (209 divided by 26 countries). 
 
                                                 
4 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are not included in the analysis because of unreliability of their household 
surveys. 
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 Among our explanatory variables, the one that we are most interested in is a set of 
policy variables as defined and numerically estimated by EBRD. We shall use these 
variables both as an indicator of the average intensity of reforms (taking an unweighted 
average of all nine EBRD reform indexes), and as each reform separately.5  
 
 Other right-hand side variables are pretty straightforward. They include annual 
real growth rate, government expenditures as percentage of GDP, and annual inflation 
rate as measured by the change in the consumer price index (all three obtained from 
World Development Indicators). It may be worth briefly mentioning their evolution in 
time since all three are reflective of the transition process.   
 
 The growth rates are available annually for 24 countries.6 The average 
unweighted rate at the onset of transition, in 1991 and 1992, was minus 13 and minus 19 
percent.7 Beginning with 1995, the average unweighted growth rate turned positive, 
almost monotonically increasing from about 1 percent in 1995 to more than 6 percent at 
the end of the period. This is a remarkable turnaround although the depth of the early 
depression means that eleven countries’ GDPs per capita are still below their 1990 levels. 
8 The population-weighted area’s average GDP per capita is now only 2 percent above its 
1990 level, and total real GDP of the area is exactly the same as sixteen years ago.  
However, illustrating the recent turnaround, we note, for example, that since 2000, there 
have been only five observations of negative (and mildly so) growth rates while there 
were 18 observations of growth rates in excess of 10 percent per annum.  At the 
beginning of the period, the situation was exactly the reverse: in the years 1991 and 1992, 
there were no fewer than 30 observations of double-digit negative growth.  
                                                 
5 The reform areas are the followings: large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and 
enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, 
banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and 
infrastructure reform.  The EBRD indices come from the EBRD Transition Report, reflecting progress in 
all of these areas. Each of these individual EBRD indices is reported on a 1 to 4+ scale with higher numbers 
indicating greater reform progress.  
 
6 We do not have data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.  
 
7 The average unweighted means that each country/year counts as one observation. 
 
8 GDP per capita (and total GDP) are measured at 2005 international prices.  
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  The evolution of inflation is very similar to that of growth: years of low growth 
were also the years of high inflation, and vice versa. The average unweighted inflation 
rate for the transition countries decreased from its peak of more than 1000 percent in 
1992, and just below 1000 in 1993, to around 6 percent in both 2004 and 2005. Again, 
from 1993, the decline in the unweighted inflation rate was monotonical: each successive 
year saw a lower average rate. The evolutions of unweighted growth rate and inflation are 
shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Average (unweighted) growth rate and inflation  
during the transition, 1990-2005 
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 Note: GDP growth in percent per annum (broken line; left axis). Inflation in percent per annum 
(right axis). Data are unweighted average of 26 transition economies.  
 
 The situation is just slightly different with government expenditures as a share of   
GDP.  Government spending was inelastic, both when incomes severely dropped at the 
onset of the transition and when they kept on increasing later. Thus, the unweighted 
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government spending as a share of GDP reached its peak of 42 percent in 1992, and more 
of less continuously dropped to under 30 percent by the end of the period.  
 
 The broad contours of the changes in our key variables during the transition are 
remarkably clear. Of course, this holds for the sample as a whole; the evolution for each 
individual country is bound to show peculiarities of its own. On average, inequality grew 
between 1990 and 1995 and stayed stable since; growth was negative over the same 
period, and after 1995 increased steadily year after year; inflation peaked in 1992 and 
1993 and has since steadily gone down, and government expenditures as a share of GDP 
peaked around the point where the average output hit its bottom (1993 and 1994) and 
have gone down even since.  
 
 With regard to transitional reforms, over the past decade and half, most transition 
countries have made significant progress (see Figure 3 and Annex 2), but two broad 
patterns have emerged. In the more advanced countries such as Poland and Estonia, rapid 
liberalization and sustained macroeconomic stabilization have laid the basis for gradual 
institutional change.  The bulk of these changes have been driven by the process of 
European integration. By 2005, the countries with the highest average EBRD index were 
Hungary with the value of almost 4 (out of the maximum of 4.33), Estonia and Czech 
republic (around 3.8). In the beginning of the transition, in 1989, Estonia and Czech 
republic had a reform index at the very minimum level of 1, and Hungary at 1.3. Overall, 
as Figure 3 shows, East European countries remained ahead of CIS countries and the 
difference even increased recently. As for the least advanced countries such as 
Turkmenistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan, progress in liberalization and privatization has 
been slow and uneven and stabilization has been jeopardized by the persistence of soft 
budget constraints. In 2005, Turkmenistan mean reform index stood at 1.3, Belarus’s 1.8 
and Uzbekistan’s 2.1. Thus, reform-wise, they seem to be almost where many of the 
advanced countries were after one or two years of  the transition. For both  East European 
and particularly CIS countries, the intensity of reforms was greater up to the mid-1990s 
(as shown by the steepness of the line in Figure 3 and a flexion point around 1995) than 
 10
afterwards. This is as expected since reform index is bounded from above (as are, in a 
more substantive sense, reforms too).  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of average EBRD reform indicator in Eastern Europe and 
Commonwealth of Independent States, 1990-2005 
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Note: Unweighted average. 
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 3. What explains change in inequality? 
 
Explaining the increase of inequality during the transition has to rely on very little 
theory. The reason is to some extent obvious, namely that the transition from 
Communism to capitalism took place quickly and unexpectedly, so no a priori theory was 
developed. After the beginning of transition, and faced with the often dramatic increases 
in inequality, several papers tried to formalize the factors and mechanisms associated 
with the increase. They were reviewed in Section 1. Milanovic (1999) saw increased 
inequality arising from the transfer of labor force from an egalitarian public sector to a 
much more in inegalitarian private sector. In his view, the structural, or rather, ownership, 
transformation was the primary force behind increased inequality. Similarly, Ivaschenko 
(2002) linked privatization and structural change expressed as “deindustrializaton” to 
increased inequality. But, as discussed in the review of the existing literature, other 
factors were, in a heuristic fashion, also associated with changes in inequality. Noticing 
smaller increases in Central Europeans countries whose welfare systems “survived” the 
first wave of transition much better than those of the former Soviet republics. Keene and 
Prasad (2002) argued that maintaining social expenditures provided a strong cushion 
against runaway inequality. In an early article on the political economy of reforms, 
Hellman (1988) linked high levels of inequality to non-completed reforms. In his simple 
cross-section, both the more advanced reformers in Central Europe and non-reformers in 
Central Asia had lower levels of inequality than reformers that stopped “halfway” like 
Russia and Ukraine. Hellman ascribed these developments to the entrenched role of the 
new oligarchic elites. 
 
 Following on some of these insights, we estimate country fixed-effect model 
where inequality is associated with growth rate of the economy (measured by the annual 
GDI increase), inflation rate (measured by the annual increase in the consumer price 
index), intensity of structural reforms (measured to be the unweighted average value of 
nine EBRD reform indices), government spending as a share of GDI, and level of 
country’s democracy (as measured by the Polity database). In addition, we control for the 
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type of survey instrument used (income or expenditures), and the survey reference period 
(whether monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual). From the existing literature, both 
transition-, and non-transition-based, we can derive expectations regarding the role of 
some of the explanatory variables. For example, inflation is generally found to be 
positively associated with inequality (Bulir, 2001). Social expenditures, as already 
mentioned, are expected to dampen the rise in inequality. Democracy is also generally 
found to be anti-inequality although the evidence is not very robust (e.g., Bollen and 
Jackman, 1985; Li, Squire and Zou 1998; but see also Rodrik, 1999). But for a couple of 
variables we do not have strong priors based on theory or existing empirical evidence. 
For example, different types of reforms may be thought to affect inequality differently. 
While there is little disagreement that privatization is likely to increase inequality (see in 
particular Ivaschenko, 2002), other reforms may have the opposite effect. Thus, financial 
liberalization, associated with financial deepening and easier access to credit could be 
thought to be pro-equality, as indeed some influential papers have argued (e.g., Li, Squire 
and Zou, 1998).  For this reason, in addition to reforms overall whose effects are explored 
in this section, we shall look (in Section 4) at the effect of each individual reform. Even 
less a priori obvious is the effect of the growth rate of the economy. Its effect cannot 
even be postulated in advance since some growth-inducing policies may be pro-poor and 
others anti-poor. Therefore, whether the growth process as such has been pro- or anti-
poor should emerge as result of the empirical analysis rather than be hypothesized in 
advance. 
 
The regressions are run across each decile share defined as the share of i-th decile 
(deciles running from 1, the poorest, to 10, the richest) in total survey income (or total 
survey expenditures. depending of what is the survey instrument).We use the method of 
SURE (seemingly unrelated regressions) where each individual left-hand side variable is 
regressed on the same set of explanatory variables.9 Since the decile shares sum to 1, we 
impose constraints on the coefficients such that the sum of products of coefficients 
associated with a given variable and decile shares be equal to 0. In other words, we want 
                                                 
9 Although OLS estimators are consistent, SURE provides greater efficiency, and efficiency gains increase 
as correlation between errors across equations goes up (which is the case here; see Greene, 2000). 
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to guarantee that an infinitesimal increase in an explanatory variable leaves the sum of 
income shares unchanged, that is equal to 1.  
 
The regression is written as 
 
ijtj
jttjtjtjtjtjtijt
eDD
DSDIjDEMEXPREFINFGD
++
++++++++=
8
76543210
β
ββββββββ
(1)  
 
 where subscripts i, j and t denote respectively decile, country, and time (year), D 
= decile share, 10 G = real growth rate, INF = annual inflation, REF = the average 
unweighted  EBRD reform index, EXP = total government expenditures as percentage of 
GDI, DEM = value of Polity2 variable from the Polity database (ranging from -10 for 
complete dictatorship to +10 for full democracy), DI = dummy variable for whether 
survey is income- or  expenditures-based, DS = dummy variable for survey reference 
period (monthly, quarterly, semiannual and annual), DD = country dummy and eijt = error 
term.11 To control for inter- and intra-country heteroskedasticity, the regressions are run 
with robust (Huber-White) standard errors.12 Since reforms were, in almost all cases, 
influenced or imposed from abroad, being at first mostly of the Washington Consensus 
type favored by the World Bank, EBRD and the IMF, and later of the “milder” type 
favored by the European Union, their exogeneity seems patent. It is very unlikely that 
they were responding to domestic income distribution concerns.  
                                                 
10 In regressions, decile share are expressed as a multiple as the mean rather than as the percentages of the 
total.  Thus, the bottom decile’s share of (say) 3 percent of total income is translated as 0.3 mean incomes. 
This can be interpreted as the average income of the bottom decile normalized by the mean.  
 
11 Inflation is defined, as usual, as ln (1 + annual inflation rate); EBRD index runs from 1 to 4.33. Real 
growth rate, annual inflation, government expenditures as a share of GDI are all from the World Bank 
database (World Development Indicators). Polity2 variable is from PolityIV database (accessible at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), and EBRD index is compiled from various annual 
EBRD reports. 
 
12 We perform Breusch-Pagan test of independence to see whether correlations are zero or not. The null 
hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.  
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 The results are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, there are 177 surveys which 
gives a total of 1770 data points (for all ten deciles).13 Each regression is run over 177 
points belonging to a given decile. The panel is unbalanced as some countries have many 
more observations than others. However, since we adjust for unobserved fixed country 
effects this should not affect the estimated values of the coefficients. The R-square runs 
between 0.5 and 0.6 for the bottom six deciles and the top decile. For the four upper-
middle deciles, R2 are lower, ranging between 0.2 and 0.38. 
 
 
 
13 Some of income distribution (decile) information is lost because of lack of independent variables for 
those particular countries and years.  
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 We shall consider results one by one. Growth rate is strongly anti-poor as the 
coefficients on the two bottom deciles are statistically significantly negative and likewise 
the coefficients on the top two deciles are significantly positive. Across the rest of the 
income distribution, higher growth rate is neutral, that is, does not affect decile shares. 
The implication is that acceleration of growth has generally left the income share of the 
poor lower. This does not imply however that their average income had gone down since 
a smaller share might have been counterbalanced by a higher overall income but it still 
highlights a concern that advantages of growth were unbalanced and tended to accrue 
mostly to higher income groups. And in effect, while statistically significant, the absolute 
amount of the effect seems to be small. For the bottom decile, one percent acceleration in 
growth is associated with a decrease in its income share by 0.026 percentage points. The 
average income share of the bottom decile is 3.2 percentage points. Thus, to keep the 
absolute real income of the bottom decile from falling, the growth acceleration needs to 
be greater than 0.8 percent14 which, as we have seen, is the case by assumption. For the 
second decile, the outcome is ever stronger, as the implicit growth rate needed to keep its 
absolute income from falling is only 0.13 percent. We conclude that higher growth 
tended to increase absolute incomes of the poorest too but did so less than in proportion 
to the rest (see Figure 4, left panel).    
 
14 Calculated as follows. One percent (0.01) acceleration multiplied by the coefficient of -0.265 and 
multiplied further by 10 (since deciles shares as expressed as the multiples of the mean) and then divided 
by the average decile share of the bottom (3.2 percent).  
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  The effect of inflation is clear. It tended to influence negatively (in a statistically 
significant way), the income shares of the bottom five deciles, and positively the top two 
(see Figure 4, right panel). This result, as mentioned before, does correspond with our 
expectations and with earlier findings in the literature. 
 
 Similar is the effect of structural reforms measured by the EBRD index. Greater 
level of reforms is strongly negatively associated with the income shares of the four lower 
deciles, and positively with the shares of the top two deciles. For example, one standard 
deviation increase in the reform index (0.84 EBRD points) is associated with about 1.1 
percentage point share increase for the top decile. Note that the top decile receives, on 
average, 25 percent of total income. Hence, the gains from reforms are not negligible for 
the top income group. For the bottom decile, on the other hand, one-standard deviation 
increase in reforms reduces the share by 0.4 percent. Their (bottom decile’s) average 
share in the sample is 3.2 percent of total income. Accordingly, in order for greater 
reforms to increase the absolute income of the bottom decile, the increase in total income 
generated by reforms must be in excess of 12.5 percent (0.4 divided by 3.2). This is, of 
course, an extremely high growth on a yearly basis and, in the short-term, reforms are 
therefore very unlikely to be pro-poor in an absolute sense as far as the bottom income 
decile is concerned. 
 
 A somewhat surprising finding is that greater government expenditures seem to 
be distribution-neutral. In effect, for no decile, except weakly for the ninth decile, do 
greater expenditures (as a share of GDI) show either positive or negative statistically 
significant coefficient. The effect which is generally very strong (including here; 
regressions not shown in the text) when run in a cross-country setting dissipates in a 
model where we control for country effects. In other words, the conclusion that the 
difference between inequality in (say) Poland and Russia may be related to their 
governments’ spending amounts does not seem to be warranted. Once we control for 
unobserved country characteristics, we cannot argue that greater government spending in 
Russia (or in Poland) would result in less inequality. It seems that all of the identification 
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of this variable’s effect on inequality comes from cross-country variation. Part of the 
problem may lie, however, in the fact that government expenditures include all kinds of 
expenditures not all of which may be directed toward the poor or lower middle classes. If 
one could isolate social component of total government expenditures (which 
unfortunately the data do not allow us to do), it could be that the effect would cease to be 
insignificant. 
 
 The effect of democracy is very interesting. Its pro-equality effect cuts very 
“deeply” because it raises the income shares of the bottom six deciles, is then “neutral” 
for the following three deciles, and strongly anti top decile. The increase of one 
democracy point on the 21-point Polity scale increases the share of the bottom decile by 
0.08 percentage points which seems small in absolute amounts but not so when we reflect 
that the average share of the bottom decile is only 3.2 percentage points. In other words, 
one point increase in the democracy indicator is equal to a distribution-neutral growth 
rate of some 2.5 percent (0.08 divided by 3.2). The effect is similar for the following two 
deciles (second and third).  An intriguing result is that a combination of modest 
democratization (increase of 1 Polity point) and modest acceleration in growth (1 
percent), will, on average, increase absolute incomes of the bottom deciles even if growth 
per se has a disequalizing effect. However, a very strong negative effect of reforms on 
bottom decile share cannot be so easily offset by democratization.  
 
 As a robustness check, we also introduce the ratio between exports of some key 
natural resources (oil, natural gas, diamonds and gold) and GDI.15  This is done in order 
to test the hypothesis that natural resource exports tend to be associated with more 
unequal distributions. In this case, however, the coefficient on natural resource exports 
variable is insignificant throughout, while coefficients on the other variables are not 
affected.   
 
 Finally, the effects of the survey instrument (income or expenditure) or reference 
period are statistically insignificant throughout. 
                                                 
15  The results are not shown here; they are available from the authors on request. 
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 4. The role of individual EBRD reform indicators 
 
 In the previous section, the intensity of structural reforms in transition countries 
has been measured by the unweighted average of the nine EBRD transitional indicators: 
However, as already mentioned, it is highly likely that these various components of the 
EBRD transition index could have different and even opposing effects in the evolution of 
inequality.  For example, while large scale privatization may likely lead to an increase 
inequality (e.g., Ivaschenko, 2002), financial liberalization could have the opposite effect 
(e.g., Li, Squire and Zou, 1998).  Hence, in this section we analyze the effect on decile 
shares of each of the nine EBRD transitional indicators separately. 
 
 Table 2 presents the coefficients from a seemingly unrelated regression equation 
(SURE) of the share of deciles where all nine EBRD transition indicators are used 
explanatory variables. Before discussing the results, it is worth mentioning that the other 
key explanatory variables stayed robust despite introducing a new set of explanatory 
structural reform variables. For example, both the signs and significance of growth, 
inflation, government expenditures, and democracy variables remained robust, i.e., the 
same as they were in the previous regressions (Table 1). Therefore, this section discusses 
the effects on inequality of the EBRD transition indicators only. 
 
 Large and small scale privatization schemes appear to have opposing effects on 
the evolution of inequality in the transition countries.  The statistically significant and 
positive coefficients on the bottom five deciles suggest that progress in small scale 
privatization is strongly pro-poor.  This observation is further strengthened by the 
statistically significant negative coefficients on the top three deciles.  On other hand, 
large scale privatization tends to worsen inequality as implied by the negative coefficients 
(albeit not significant at conventional level) on the bottom deciles’ income shares.   
 
 Another EBRD reform that has significant bearing on the evolution of inequality 
is progress in reforming infrastructure, which includes electric power, railways, roads, 
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telecommunications, water, and waste. Reforms in these infrastructure and utility sectors 
have worsened inequality.  They appear to benefit mostly those in the top two deciles (i.e., 
the richest 20 percent) of the population. Nearly 70 percent of the population has seen 
their share of consumption or income decline as a result of infrastructure privatization 
and fee-changes. This outcome may be partly explained by the fact that infrastructure 
privatization meant the abolition of monolithic government ownership of these structures 
that used to provide at times inefficient, yet subsidized and/or free,  services to their 
citizens. The sizes of the two strongly significant effects (pro-poor small scale 
privatization and pro-rich infrastructure reform) are such that they almost exactly balance 
each other out: 1 point increase in the respective EBRD indexes produces about the same 
absolute effect.16
 
 
 The rest of the EBRD transition indicators played more or less non-discriminatory 
role in the evolution of inequality.  Enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power 
and to promote a competitive business environment appear to favor those in the middle 
income classes, with no significant effect on the poorest and the richest.  Improvement in 
the banking laws and regulations, and financial deepening also benefit more those in the 
middle and upper income brackets.  There is some indication that enterprise restructuring 
tends to favor the very top income class to the detriment of the middle. If job losses, 
following upon restructuring, are concentrated among middle classes, this is not 
surprising. The rest of the EBRD components are inequality-neutral.  But in some cases, 
that neutrality is quite remarkable: thus price liberalization, and foreign trade and 
exchange rate liberalization, frequently regarded as anti-poor, at least in the short term, 
appear to have an entirely neutral effect on income distribution.  
 
  
 
 
16 Of course, this is merely of an econometric rather  than real relevance since one point increase in EBRD 
index may involve vastly different policies in the case of infrastructure reform than in the case of small-
scale privatization. 
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   5. Conclusions 
 
 Using for the first time micro data from household surveys in an unbalanced panel 
framework covering 26 transition economies over sixteen year period, the paper has 
investigated the correlates of inequality increase in post-Communist countries. Another 
feature the paper has been the use, not of a single inequality index like a Gini coefficient, 
but decile shares which give a much more detailed picture of  changes in the entire 
distribution. While, for example, the Gini coefficient can remain unchanged with 
increases in income shares among both the rich and the poor (and a corresponding decline 
in the middle); the share-based analysis captures these changes well. Using the method of 
seemingly-unrelated regressions, run for each decile, and fixed (country effect) 
specification, we find that reforms, as measured by the average EBRD index for a given 
country/year, have had a robust negative effect on income shares of the bottom four 
deciles, and positive on income shares of the top two deciles.  
 
The intuitive feeling that reforms in post-communist countries were anti-poor (at 
least in the distributional sense) is confirmed. Breaking down the reform index into its 
nine EBRD-defined types of reforms, we find that the  negative effect on income shares 
of the bottom is associated mostly with infrastructural reforms which included 
introduction (or increases) of fees for services, and privatization of  electricity, railways, 
roads, water provision etc. On the other hand, small scale privatization is associated with 
the opposite (pro-poor) effect. Among the other relevant variables, the most important 
and significant is the role of democracy which raises the incomes shares of the bottom 
and middle deciles. Not surprisingly, we find inflation to be anti-poor: highly significant 
for the income shares of both the bottom and the top. Growth as such has, on the other 
hand, been disequalizing. However, this effect is sufficiently small so that growth overall 
is associated with an increase in real income of the bottom deciles (including the 
lowest)—that is, even if the bottom decile’s income share is reduced. In other words, 
growth was anti-poor in relative, but not in an absolute, sense. Finally, once we control 
for country-effects, we find absence of association between government expenditures as a 
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share of GDI and inequality. Thus, the oft-quoted relationship between government 
spending and inequality in (say) Poland vs. Russia (with spending being high in Poland 
and hence, it is argued, inequality low) seems to get its entire identification from cross-
country level regressions.  
 
 What policy implications emerge from this work? First, it is important to look at 
the reform process in a more nuanced and discriminating way. This in particular refers to 
the negative role played by infrastructural reform that might have been often pushed onto 
the population too fast and too hard. The result also shows that the attempts to cushion 
low income groups from the effects of such reforms have been unsuccessful. Second, it 
confirms the importance of small-scale privatization in keeping inequality in check—
probably by providing much needed jobs. Third, it shows a crucial role played by 
democratization and control of inflation. Fourth, it leads us to be much more skeptical in 
using government spending as a means to redistribute resources toward the poorer strata. 
Fifth, it shows that growth is crucial for real incomes of all including the poor, even if it 
tends to be (in relative terms) disequalizing. Sixth, it shows that price and trade 
liberalization, often regarded as detrimental to the poor, were not so in the context of 
post-Communist transition: the effect of both is entirely distribution-neutral.  
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Annex 1. Average share of bottom and top decile, by country, period 1990-2005 
 
Country Country 
abbreviation 
Bottom 
decile 
Top decile Top-to-
bottom 
ratio 
Number of 
observations 
Albania ALB 3.63 23.40 6.45 3 
Armenia ARM 3.43 26.53 7.74 7 
Bulgaria BGR 3.07 25.39 8.28 14 
Bosnia BIH 3.72 23.27 6.26 2 
Belarus BLR 3.98 21.66 5.44 9 
Czech Republic CZE 4.50 22.29 4.95 6 
Estonia EST 2.58 27.05 10.46 11 
Georgia GEO 2.30 28.70 12.46 11 
Croatia HRV 3.43 24.98 7.29 2 
Hungary HUN 3.51 23.83 6.80 13 
Kazakhstan KAZ 3.26 24.30 7.45 6 
Kyrghyz Republic KGZ 3.59 25.31 7.06 9 
Lithuania LTU 2.94 25.25 8.59 10 
Latvia LVA 3.05 25.70 8.42 11 
Moldova MDA 2.48 29.94 12.05 7 
Macedonia MKD 2.92 24.47 8.37 8 
Montenegro MON 3.21 25.13 7.84 2 
Poland POL 3.01 24.96 8.29 16 
Romania ROM 3.13 24.93 7.96 9 
Russia RUS 2.50 27.52 11.00 12 
Serbia SRB 3.31 24.03 7.26 7 
Slovakia SVK 4.50 21.20 4.71 4 
Slovenia SVN 4.00 20.78 5.20 11 
Tajikistan TJK 3.29 25.70 7.82 3 
Ukraine UKR 3.61 22.45 6.22 11 
Uzbekistan UZB 2.77 27.01 9.77 5 
Total  3.21 24.97 7.78 209 
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Annex 2: Evolution of the main EBRD transition indices 
 
EBRD index Country 
Code  
1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-present 
     
ALB Large scale privatization 1.14 2.47 3 
 Small scale privatization 2.29 4 4 
 Infrastructure 1.05 1.46 2 
 Restructuring 1.29 2 2 
 EBRD Average 1.58 2.58 2.84 
     
ARM Large scale privatization 1.14 3 3.33 
 Small scale privatization 1.71 3.2 3.8 
 Infrastructure 1.14 2.07 2.33 
 Restructuring 1.14 2 2.26 
 EBRD Average 1.39 2.61 2.97 
     
AZE Large scale privatization 1 1.67 2 
 Small scale privatization 1 3 3.6 
 Infrastructure 1 1.4 1.8 
 Restructuring 1.1 1.67 1.87 
 EBRD Average 1.21 2.21 2.55 
     
BGR Large scale privatization 1.52 2.93 3.8 
 Small scale privatization 1.52 3.2 3.67 
 Infrastructure 1.14 2.2 3 
 Restructuring 1.29 2.26 2.53 
 EBRD Average 1.76 2.81 3.3 
     
BIH Large scale privatization 1 1.6 2.4 
 Small scale privatization 2.43 2.07 2.93 
 Infrastructure 1 1.46 2.26 
 Restructuring 1 1.4 1.87 
 EBRD Average 1.35 1.84 2.43 
     
BLR Large scale privatization 1.29 1 1 
 Small scale privatization 1.43 2 2.2 
 Infrastructure 1 1.13 1.33 
 Restructuring 1.1 1.13 1 
 EBRD Average 1.34 1.62 1.78 
     
CZE Large scale privatization 2.29 4 4 
 Small scale privatization 3 4.33 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.62 2.73 3.2 
 Restructuring 2.14 3.07 3.33 
 EBRD Average 2.34 3.49 3.71 
     
EST Large scale privatization 1.86 4 4 
 Small scale privatization 2.29 4.33 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.86 2.8 3.33 
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EBRD index Country 
Code  
1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-present 
     
 Restructuring 2 3 3.4 
 EBRD Average 2.04 3.44 3.77 
     
GEO Large scale privatization 1.14 3.26 3.4 
 Small scale privatization 1.57 4 4 
 Infrastructure 1 1.87 2.33 
 Restructuring 1.14 2 2.07 
 EBRD Average 1.29 2.73 2.95 
     
HRV Large scale privatization 1.71 3 3.2 
 Small scale privatization 3.43 4.33 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.43 2.13 2.87 
 Restructuring 1.29 2.67 2.8 
 EBRD Average 2.05 3.07 3.35 
     
HUN Large scale privatization 2.43 4 4 
 Small scale privatization 2.19 4.26 4.33 
 Infrastructure 2.14 3.33 3.67 
 Restructuring 2.29 3.2 3.4 
 EBRD Average 2.54 3.73 3.88 
     
KAZ Large scale privatization 1.43 3 3 
 Small scale privatization 1.76 3.87 4 
 Infrastructure 1.1 2 2.33 
 Restructuring 1 2 2 
 EBRD Average 1.4 2.76 2.89 
     
KGZ Large scale privatization 1.86 3 3.27 
 Small scale privatization 2.29 4 4 
 Infrastructure 1.09 1.33 1.6 
 Restructuring 1.29 2 2 
 EBRD Average 1.63 2.77 2.86 
     
LTU Large scale privatization 2 3 3.67 
 Small scale privatization 2.43 4.13 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.1 2.33 2.67 
 Restructuring 1.43 2.74 2.93 
 EBRD Average 1.84 3.11 3.5 
     
LVA Large scale privatization 1.57 3 3.47 
 Small scale privatization 2.29 4.07 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.29 2.53 3 
 Restructuring 1.57 2.74 2.87 
 EBRD Average 1.87 3.14 3.49 
     
MDA Large scale privatization 1.57 3 3 
 Small scale privatization 1.43 3.27 3.67 
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EBRD index Country 
Code  
1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-present 
     
 Infrastructure 1 1.93 2.2 
 Restructuring 1.29 2 1.87 
 EBRD Average 1.53 2.67 2.81 
     
MKD Large scale privatization 1.43 3 3.13 
 Small scale privatization 3.29 4 4 
 Infrastructure 1.28 1.74 2.13 
 Restructuring 1.29 2.07 2.33 
 EBRD Average 1.94 2.67 2.93 
     
MON Large scale privatization 1 1.27 2.6 
 Small scale privatization 3 2.2 2.8 
 Infrastructure 1.19 1.33 1.6 
 Restructuring 1 1 1.67 
 EBRD Average 1.57 1.5 2.25 
     
POL Large scale privatization 2.14 3.26 3.33 
 Small scale privatization 3.43 4.33 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.86 2.93 3.33 
 Restructuring 2.29 3 3.4 
 EBRD Average 2.53 3.47 3.68 
     
ROM Large scale privatization 1.62 2.74 3.47 
 Small scale privatization 1.71 3.4 3.67 
 Infrastructure 1 2.2 3.13 
 Restructuring 1.43 2 2.07 
 EBRD Average 1.62 2.81 3.13 
     
RUS Large scale privatization 2 3.26 3.26 
 Small scale privatization 2.14 4 4 
 Infrastructure 1.29 2.13 2.47 
 Restructuring 1.24 1.93 2.33 
 EBRD Average 1.74 2.7 2.88 
   
SRB Large scale privatization 1 1 2.07 
 Small scale privatization 3 3 3.13 
 Infrastructure 1.19 1.67 2 
 Restructuring 1 1 1.87 
 EBRD Average 1.57 1.46 2.33 
 EBRD Average 2.23 3.24 3.58 
     
SVN Large scale privatization 1.52 2.93 3 
 Small scale privatization 3.43 4.33 4.33 
 Infrastructure 1.43 2.4 3 
 Restructuring 1.62 2.67 2.93 
 EBRD Average 2.24 3.18 3.36 
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EBRD index Country 
Code  
1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-present 
     
TJK Large scale privatization 1.14 2.13 2.33 
 Small scale privatization 1.57 2.73 3.74 
 Infrastructure 1 1 1.13 
 Restructuring 1 1.4 1.67 
 EBRD Average 1.25 1.94 2.25 
     
TKM Large scale privatization 1 1.6 1 
 Small scale privatization 1.1 1.93 2 
 Infrastructure 1 1 1 
 Restructuring 1 1.4 1 
 EBRD Average 1.06 1.4 1.3 
     
UKR Large scale privatization 1.14 2.33 3 
 Small scale privatization 1.43 3.26 3.8 
 Infrastructure 1 1.6 2 
 Restructuring 1.14 2 2 
 EBRD Average 1.31 2.48 2.77 
     
UZB Large scale privatization 1.38 2.67 2.67 
 Small scale privatization 1.71 3 3 
 Infrastructure 1 1.2 1.67 
 Restructuring 1.14 1.93 1.67 
 EBRD Average 1.4 2.1 2.1 
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